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1.

Introduction
“After all, you only find out who is swimming naked when the tide goes
out.” Warren Buffett in the letter to shareholders (2001).

Measures of default risk predict low future stock returns (Dichev, 1998, Campbell,
Hilscher, and Szilagyi, 2008) – this empirical finding has given rise to the so-called ”distress anomaly,” since standard models suggest that the equity of firms with high default
risk is more exposed to aggregate risk and therefore should command higher expected
returns. Recently, Park (2013) sheds more light on this finding by documenting that
low returns on financially distressed stocks are concentrated among firms that issue discounted equity to new investors via private offerings of public equity that dilute existing
shareholders. Although intriguing, these findings do not per se resolve the distress puzzle
since existing investors may use default risk measures to predict dilution and thus should
appropriately adjust prices for expected dilution. Additionally, proximity to default appears to play an important role for momentum returns, since momentum profits are
restricted to high credit risk firms and are nonexistent for firms of high credit quality, as
documented by Avramov, Chordia, Jostova, and Philipov (2007). In this paper, I develop
a dynamic asset pricing model that proposes two related channels that can reconcile these
empirical facts based on investors’ rational formation of beliefs about distressed firm’s
chances of future recovery: first, passive learning from firm performance, and secondly,
active investors’ information acquisition and its externality on other investors.
The first channel, learning from firm performance, is related to Schumpeter’s (1934)
argument that recessions have a positive, ”cleansing effect” on the economy. Equity
holders benefit in aggregate downturns from a high speed of learning about illiquid firms’
chances of future recovery. When exposed to the test of a downturn, truly insolvent firms
are more likely to show adverse performance that allows equity holders to separate them
from solvent but illiquid firms. Executing their default option in the case of insolvent
firms then allows equity holders to quickly limit their losses from subsidizing debt holders. Learning about firm solvency thus positively affects equity holders’ default option
value in aggregate downturns, thereby reducing distressed firms’ exposure to businesscycle frequency risks. These low-frequency risks are in turn major determinants of risk
premia when investors have recursive preferences,1 as emphasized by the long-run risk
literature (Bansal and Yaron, 2004, Hansen, Heaton, and Li, 2008).2 The analysis re1

See Kreps and Porteus (1978), Epstein and Zin (1989), Weil (1990).
The quality of information is not to be confused with the physical uncertainty of the underlying
earnings process. Increased uncertainty about the underlying naturally increases the value of the option.
2
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veals that the proposed learning channel can even rationalize negative equity risk premia
for distressed firms that have strongly pro-cyclical underlying earnings dynamics. Further, the theory can explain why portfolios consisting of the most financially distressed
stocks would obtain negative unconditional alpha estimates. As the quintile of stocks
with the most financially distressed stocks is closer to default in downturns, learning
has a stronger positive effect on the corresponding portfolio value, implying lower conditional betas with respect to long-run risks and lower expected returns in these times.
Importantly, the resulting negative correlation between market risk premia and conditional betas implies upward biased beta estimates and negatively biased alpha estimates
in standard unconditional CAPM regressions.3 This prediction is supported by recent
empirical evidence by O’Doherty (2012) who finds that the correlation between market
risk premia and conditional betas of distressed stocks accounts for about two thirds of
the negative unconditional alpha of financially distressed firms.
The model further sheds light on the empirical finding by Avramov, Chordia, Jostova,
and Philipov (2007) that momentum profits are restricted to high credit risk firms and are
nonexistent for firms of high credit quality. Positive correlations between price changes
and expected returns obtain, since firms that receive bad news and get closer to the
default boundary also have lower expected return premia going forward. A momentum
strategy that goes long recent winners and shorts recent losers among distressed firms can
therefore generate a large spread in expected returns. Consistent with this theoretical
argument, Avramov, Chordia, Jostova, and Philipov (2007) find that both the extreme
loser and winner portfolios consist of stocks with the lowest and the next-lowest credit
rating, respectively.
The second channel of the model is also related to learning and highlights an externality that has previously not been studied in the the dynamic asset pricing literature: active
investors’ effect on other claim holders’ exposure to aggregate risk via their impact on
the firm’s refinancing and liquidation decisions. Active investors (for example, activist
hedge funds or private equity funds) typically acquire substantial stakes in distressed
firms’ private placements of public equity. In the model, these specialized investors may
exert costly effort to acquire information on distressed firms’ chances of future recovery.
Management endogenously issues equity to one such investor when the firm becomes
illiquid and existing investors are uncertain whether the firm is fundamentally solvent.4
Providing one investor with a large equity stake helps resolve a standard free-rider prob3

See, e.g., Grant (1977) and Jagannathan and Wang (1996).
Brophy, Ouimet, and Sialm (2009) document that hedge funds tend to finance companies that have
poor fundamentals and pronounced informational frictions, and require substantial discounts.
4
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lem present among small investors (see, e.g., Grossman and Hart (1980) and Shleifer
and Vishny (1986)). The large investor has strictly greater incentives to acquire costly
information that helps identifying insolvent firms and avoids implicit subsidies to debt
holders. Existing shareholders can partially free ride on the active investor’s effort going
forward and thus are willing to provide the active investor initially with a discounted
purchase price, that is, a price lower than the equilibrium market value of the stake
obtained. Due to its superior information, the active investor assumes a pivotal role in
the firm’s future liquidation and refinancing decisions which affect the value of all equity
holders, thus creating an externality.
The active investor’s involvement helps resolve debt overhang problems (Myers, 1977)
that are typical for firms close to default. Better information about a firm’s future
performance has the positive effect of avoiding unnecessary defaults by firms that are
merely temporarily illiquid but fundamentally solvent. Yet better information also has
redistributional effects. In particular, debt holders of insolvent firms are ceteris paribus
worse off, since better informed equity holders quickly abandon insolvent firms, and thus
stop subsidizing debt holders via equity injections. The analysis shows that although
endogenous information acquisition can have similarly adverse effects on debt holders as
risk shifting (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), it does not require any change in the underlying
assets or in contracts.
Importantly, active investor’s information acquisition not only affects expected cash
flows but also the risk exposures of debt and equity claims. Since the speed of learning
influences valuations across aggregate states of the economy, information production can
shift aggregate risk from equity to debt claims. If learning based on a firm’s public
information is slow in aggregate downturns, the active investor has a natural incentive
to increase the speed of learning in these times, which allows off-loading systematic
risk to debt holders. Since passive shareholders do not incur information acquisition
cost on an ongoing basis, their equity stakes are even less exposed to aggregate risk
than the active investor’s position. This mechanism provides an explanation for the
puzzling empirical phenomenon that buy-and-hold returns after private offerings of public
equity are low and negatively correlated with the discounts that are provided to the large
investors that participate in these offerings (Park, 2013). In addition, the results shed
light on the general empirical finding that public companies that raise equity privately
from large specialized investors such as hedge funds significantly underperform companies
that obtain financing from other investors in the future (Brophy, Ouimet, and Sialm,
2009). In the model, management is willing to offer larger discounts to active investors
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with greater skill. A larger discount thus forecasts more effective involvement of the
active investor going forward, and thus a stronger effect on the equity’s exposure to
aggregate risk. In other words, the involvement of an active investor is a state variable
that affects distressed firms’ conditional exposures to business-cycle frequency risks.
The model further reveals that negative contemporaneous returns for existing shareholders at the time when the active investor acquires shares at a discount are not conclusive evidence that management is acting against shareholders’ interests. By conditioning
on firms that issue discounted equity to an active investor, the econometrician systematically sorts on firms that just received a negative shock and for that reason approach
an active investor. In other words, under the counter-factual without active investor
involvement, existing equity holders’ position would lose at least as much value. Since
existing shareholders gain from free riding on the active investor’s information production going forward, management is willing to provide the fund attractive terms ex ante
– in the limiting case in which the active investor has all the bargaining power, existing
shareholders are just as well off with and without discounted equity issuance.

Related literature. This paper is generally related to a growing literature on learning
in financial markets (see Pastor and Veronesi (2009) for a survey) and the relationship
between financing decisions and asset pricing.5 Gomes and Schmid (2010) for example analyze the relationship between leverage and expected stock returns in a dynamic
economy where here both corporate investment and financing decisions are endogenous.
The authors show that firms with higher leverage are typically also more mature firms
with fewer risky growth opportunities which shows the importance of controlling for the
interdependence of leverage and investment decisions when studying the cross-section
of expected returns. In terms of model ingredients the paper closest to mine is David
(2008) who analyses credit spreads in a dynamic economy with learning. Whereas in
David (2008) agents learn about the hidden drifts of real earnings growth and inflation
(both log-normal processes), I consider a setting in which agents learn about a hidden
firm-specific state that determines the firm’s transition rates between earnings states.
The benefit of the setup I propose is that it allows me to solve for the endogenous default
boundaries which are key to obtaining the main results of my paper. In contrast, David
(2008) has to make exogenous assumptions on the default boundaries in his setting in
order to solve for prices. To my knowledge, my paper is the first to characterize endoge5

See, e.g., Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec (2006), Livdan, Sapriza, and Zhang (2009), Chen (2010),
Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010), and Gomes and Schmid (2010).
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nous default boundaries in a dynamic model with learning and leverage. In addition,
my paper not only considers passive learning but also endogenous dynamic information
acquisition.
My paper’s main objective is to provide a tractable model that illustrates the profound effects that learning and information acquisition have on financially distressed
firms’ business-cycle frequency risk exposures. I do not attempt to argue that learning
is the only plausible mechanism that can help explain the distress anomaly or the other
empirical facts addressed in this paper. For example, investor irrationality can certainly
contribute toward these anomalies. However, agents’ learning about firms solvency over
the business cycle seems to be a generically relevant economic force that has its roots
in business cycle theory going back to Schumpeter’s (1934) famous ”cleansing effect of
recessions” and that can enrich our understanding of the risk characteristics of financially
distressed firms.
Regarding the distress anomaly, complementary theoretical explanations have been
put forward in the literature that have other virtues and limitations. George and Hwang
(2010) argue that firms with high financial distress costs choose low leverage to avoid
distress but retain exposure to the systematic risk of bearing such costs in low states,
implying that they have higher expected returns than highly levered firms. Garlappi
and Yan (2011) provide a model that shows how potential shareholder recovery upon
resolution of financial distress (violation of the absolute priority rule) may effectively
imply de-levering upon default, which may account for lower expected returns for firms
with high default probabilities. Similarly, Garlappi, Shu, and Yan (2008) argue that
bargaining between equity holders and debt holders in default may account for low expected equity returns on firms with high default risk given that shareholders can extract
high benefits from renegotiation.6 McQuade (2013) provides a model in which financially
distressed stocks have low equity risk premia since equity, due to its optionality, can be
negatively exposed to a volatility risk factor. In contrast to my paper, these papers do
not consider the effects of learning on expected equity returns of distressed firms and do
not address the empirical finding that low returns on financially distressed stocks are concentrated among those firms that issue discounted equity in private placements. Further,
these papers only provide an explanation why financially distressed firms should have low
expected returns. They do not resolve the puzzle why CAPM or factor model regressions
6

Hackbarth, Haselmann, and Schoenherr (2013) provide evidence that weaker creditor rights are
associated with lower equity risk premia for distressed firms. However, their evidence does not address
the distress anomaly, since it cannot explain why the CAPM and the three factor model yield negative
alphas for financially distressed firms.
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would fail to correctly capture true risk exposures of distressed firms and produce the
negative alphas. Ozdagli (2013) emphasizes that risk under the physical and risk-neutral
measure do not need to coincide, implying that the equity of firms with high physical
default risk does not need to command high risk premia. Consistent with this general
idea, I provide a learning-based economic rationale for why financially distressed firms
should indeed have low exposures to priced risk despite their high physical default risk.
In addressing the momentum anomaly but not the distress puzzle, Sagi and Seasholes
(2007) argue that a firm’s revenues, costs, and growth options jointly account for dynamics in return autocorrelation, and that account for these effects allows for enhanced
momentum strategies. Johnson (2002) provides an alternative rational explanation of
momentum effects based on stochastic expected growth rates that is also unrelated to
financial distress.
Several empirical papers analyze the relationship between private placements and
equity returns. Consistent with Park (2013), Krishnamurthy, Spindt, Subramaniam, and
Woidtke (2005) find that shareholders not participating in private placements experience
post-issue negative long-term abnormal returns. Based on my model, I argue that these
low returns may be rationalized by changes in conditional betas that occur with the
change in information quality due to private placements that involve specialized investors
such as hedge funds. Hertzel, Lemmon, Linck, and Rees (2002) also document that
public firms that place equity privately experience negative post-announcement stockprice performance. Hertzel and Smith (1993) provide empirical evidence that discounts
provided in private placements reflect information costs borne by private investors, which
is consistent with the mechanism in my model. Vassalou and Xing (2004) document that
the size effect in expected returns exists only in segments of the market with high default
risk, and that this is also largely the case for the book-to-market effect. Vassalou and
Xing (2004) further find some evidence that distressed stocks with a low distance to
default have higher returns, but this evidence comes entirely from small value stocks. Da
and Gao (2010) further provide evidence that distressed firms’ stock returns in Vassalou
and Xing (2004) are biased upwards by 1-month reversal and bid-ask bounce. Griffin and
Lemmon (2002) document that among firms with the highest distress risk the difference
in returns between high and low book-to-market securities is more than twice as large as
that in other firms. Further, the authors find that firms with high distress risk exhibit
the largest return reversals around earnings announcements. Gao, Parsons, and Shen
(2013) provide further evidence on the robustness of the distress anomaly based on a
broad international data set of 39 countries. The authors find that the distress anomaly
is not related to a country’s creditor protection environment, which is inconsistent with
7

theories based on shareholder expropriation. Gao, Parsons, and Shen (2013) further find
that the distress anomaly is especially strong in North America and Europe, that is,
developed financial markets, where active investors may play a more important role in
generating the effects highlighted in this paper.
In the following, I first present a baseline model that features learning from firm
performance. In section 3, I extend the setup to incorporate an active investor. Sector 4
concludes.

2.
2.1.

The Baseline Model
Preferences and Technology

I consider a Lucas-Breeden economy, where aggregate consumption dynamics are
specified exogenously and analyze pricing implications for marginal firms. The economy
is in continuous time and admits a representative household. Let Ct denote the rate of
aggregate consumption in the economy at time t, which follows the process7
dC (t)
= θ (Zt ) dt.
C (t)

(1)

The state variable Zt governs dynamics in the growth rate of aggregate consumption θ (Zt )
and can also affect preferences parameters, as further described below. I assume that Zt
follows a two-state continuous time Markov chain with Z ∈ {G, B}, where G refers to a
high growth state and B refers to a low growth state. By considering a larger number of
states, the model can in principle capture rich dynamics in consumption growth. Yet, for
the purposes of this paper, I will focus on the case of two aggregate states, which suffices
to highlight the central points of the argument and increases analytical tractability and
transparency of the results. I denote the transition rate between aggregate state Z and
Z 0 by λ (Z).
The representative household has the continuous-time version of state-dependent recursive preferences considered in Melino and Yang (2003). These generalized recursive
preferences are a useful tool to ensure counter-cyclical aggregate risk premia in an economy where consumption growth follows the simple two-state process considered above.
7

In the following, all processes will be right continuous with left limits. Given a process yt , the
notation yt− will denote lims↑t ys , whereas yt denotes lims↓t ys .
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In contrast, standard recursive preferences have the shortcoming that risk premia on a
claim to aggregate consumption are generally pro-cyclical in such an environment. The
only purpose of allowing for state-dependent preferences in the model is to show that
the highlighted risk-premia dynamics for financially distressed firms do not depend on
specific aggregate risk premia dynamics and robustly arise when aggregate risk premia
are counter-cyclical, which is the empirically plausible case.
The representative household maximizes
Z

∞


f (Cτ , Jτ ) dτ ,

Jt = Et

(2)

t

where f (C, J) is a normalized aggregator of current consumption C and continuation
utility J that takes the form

ρ
β
1− α(Z)
ρ
f (C, J) =
(α (Z) J)
C − α (Z) J ,
ρ

(3)

with ρ = 1 − ψ1 and α(Z) = 1 − γ(Z), and β > 0, ψ > 0, γ (Z) > 0. Here, γ has
the standard interpretation of the coefficient of relative risk aversion and is allowed to
depend on the aggregate state Z. Further, β is the rate of time preference, and ψ is the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Household maximization implies that a statepricing process ξt may be written as follows.
PROPOSITION 1 (Stochastic discount factor). The stochastic discount factor follows
a Markov-modulated jump process,
X

dξt
0
= −rf (Zt− ) dt +
(eφ(Zt− ,Z ) − 1) dNt (Zt− , Z 0 ) − λZt− Z 0 dt ,
ξt−
Z 0 6=Z

(4)

t−

where rf (Zt ) is the real risk-free rate, Nt (Z, Z 0 ) is a counting process that keeps track of
the number of Markov chain jumps from state Z to state Z 0 , and φ (Z, Z 0 ) is defined as
follows:




ρ
F (Z 0 )
0
φ (Z, Z ) ≡ 1 −
log
.
α (Z)
F (Z)
Proof. See Appendix.

9

2.2.

The Firm

Given this paper’s focus on asset pricing implications of financial distress, I consider
a firm that already has issued debt in the past. Specifically, at time t = 0, the firm has
legacy debt in place that promises debt holders a perpetual coupon rate c normalized to
1.8 Firm-specific Markov states z govern the firm’s earnings rates X (z). Let λz,z0 (Z)
denote the transition rate of from firm-state z to z 0 given the economy is in aggregate
state Z.

Firm-specific Markov states. I consider a stylized Markov chain setup that allows
studying the effects of learning on equity values in the presence of aggregate risk while
maintaining analytical tractability and transparency. I divide the set of states (z, Z) ∈ Ω
into four subsets: initial liquid states Ωl , illiquid states Ωi , and two sets of revealing
states denoted by Ωg and Ωb . Initially, the firm is assumed to be in liquid states (z, Z) ∈
Ωl = {lg , lb } × {G, B} in which it generates sufficiently high earnings to cover its interest
expenses, specifically, X (lg ) > X (lb ) > c. From the liquid states Ωl the firm can
transition into illiquid states (z, Z) ∈ Ωi = {ig , ib } × {G, B} in which earnings are below
the coupon rate c, implying that the firm has to raise equity in order not to default.
Specifically, the firm’s earnings rate is given by x < c in all illiquid states Ωi . A firm
that is in the illiquid states may either experience an endogenous default decision by
equity holders at some point, or it transitions into states that reveal its true underlying
type (insolvent vs. solvent). Let Ωg and Ωb denote the two sets of revealing states into
which the firm may transition from the firm-states z = ig and z = ib respectively. These
revealing states may be thought of as states in which earnings either deteriorate even
further so that it is clear that equity holders want to default immediately (Ωb ), or earnings
revert back up above the coupon rate c so that equity holders definitely want to hold on
to the firm (Ωg ). Figure I illustrates this Markov chain setup.

The decision problem. The decision problem at the heart of the analysis arises in
illiquid states, since equity holders have to determine whether the firm is merely illiquid
or in fact truly insolvent and should be abandoned. Specifically, the firm-specific states ig
and ib are defined so that the firm is solvent in state ig but insolvent in state ib . In other
words, if investors knew the true state of the illiquid firm, they would choose to default
in state ib and inject new funds to cover interest payments in state ig . However, since
8

Since taxes are not essential to any of the effects discussed, I abstract from them.
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the firm’s earnings rate in both these states is given by x, investors cannot directly infer
the true underlying firm-state z when observing earnings. Yet all investors are Bayesian
learners and form rational beliefs about the underlying state based on available information, such as the passage time and other potential signals. If there was no inference
Liquid states
Ωl

λz,ig(G)
Aggregate
state G (z,G)

Aggregate (z,B)
state B

Revealing states
Ωg & Ωb

Illiquid states
Ωi
Hidden firm-state z ∈ {ig,ib}

λz,ib(G)

λz,ig(B)

λz,ib(B)

(ig,G)

(ib,G)

λig,z(G)

λib,z(G)

(z,G) ∈ Ωg

(z,G) ∈ Ωb

(ig,B)

λig,z(B)

(z,B) ∈ Ωg

(ib,B)

λib,z(B)

(z,B) ∈ Ωb

FIGURE I
The figure illustrates the firm’s Markov state setup.

problem with regards to the firm-state z and equity holders knew with certainty that the
firm was in firm-state ib , they would immediately trigger default. On the other hand, if
equity holders’ knew the firm was in firm-state ig , they would be willing to provide new
equity to the firm, as the firm is merely illiquid and not insolvent. Naturally, the inference problem becomes degenerate if the equity value in firm-state ig is also not strictly
positive, since in that case the illiquid firm is always insolvent.

Alternative Markov state dynamics. To illustrate the effect of learning in the most
parsimonious way, the setup deliberately considers the case in which the firm’s state is
observable up until the point when it obtains a negative shock that causes its earnings
to drop below the required coupon payments. This negative shock may either be severe
such that the firm will not be able to recover, or more benign, implying that the firm is
temporarily illiquid but fundamentally solvent. Equity holders are eager to learn about
the underlying new state of the firm in order to make financing or default decisions that
11

is in their best interest. More generally, uncertainty about the nature of a shock to firm
fundamentals could already arise while a firm is still generating positive dividends. In this
case, the shock would not raise an immediate question about the optimality of default,
since a firm that generates positive dividends is always currently solvent. However, if
the firm were to enter an illiquid state later on, equity holders would again use past
firm performance to form beliefs about the nature of the shock (severe vs. benign) and
correspondingly firm solvency. More generally, the mechanisms highlighted in this paper
merely require that investors face uncertainty about a hidden firm state that can affect
current or future firm solvency. The fact that in the considered setup this uncertainty
arises exactly when the firm becomes illiquid is not essential but allows illustrating the
effects of learning and information acquisition in a simple and parsimonious way.

2.3.

Analysis

Solving for equity values backwards, I first analyze the revealing states Ωb , Ωg , then
illiquid states Ωi , and finally the initial liquid states Ωl .

2.3.1.

Equity Values in Revealing States

In the long-run, the firm either has defaulted while being in an illiquid state (∈ Ωi )
or has reached revealing states {Ωb , Ωg }. I will assume throughout that the firm is truly
insolvent in the revealing states (z, Z) ∈ Ωb , that is, the equity value is zero. The
equity values in the good revealing states (z, Z) ∈ Ωb are characterized in the following
proposition.
PROPOSITION 2 (Equity value in revealing states). In the states (z, Z) ∈ Ωg , the
firm’s equity value is given by
Z
V (zt , Zt ) = max
Et
∗
{τ }

t

τ∗


ξ (Zτ )
(X (zτ ) − c) dτ = v (zt , Zt )+ ,
ξ (Zt )

(5)

where the function v (z, Z) solves a system of equations that is provided in Appendix B.2.
Proof. See Appendix.
Based on the solution to the household value function provided in the proof to Proposition 1 it is straightforward to compute the equity value according to Proposition 2. Given
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the state-contingent equity values, the risk premium in state (z, Z), denoted by rp (z, Z),
may be written as follows:

rp (z, Z) =

X



φ(Z,Z 0 )

λ (Z) e

Z 0 6=Z


  V (z, Z 0 )
−1
− 1 , ∀V (z, Z) > 0.
V (z, Z)

(6)

The risk premium is naturally only defined for states (z, Z) in which the firm is still
operating and the equity value V (z, Z) is positive.

2.3.2.

Illiquid States (Ωi )

Let V (ig , Zt ) denote the equity value of the firm if investors know with certainty that
the firm is in state ig . I provide a solution to the price V (ig , Zt ) in the appendix. By
definition, the equity value in state ib is zero (V (ib , Zt ) = 0), that is, if equity holders
knew the firm is in state ib they would opt to default immediately. Yet, generally, when
the firm is illiquid and generates earnings at rate x < c, investors are uncertain about
the underlying firm-state z ∈ {ib , ig } and therefore may keep the firm afloat even though
the underlying state is ib . Let π (t) denote the probability that the firm is in state ig ,
that is, π (t) ≡ Pr [z = ig |zt ]. The following proposition characterizes the evolution of
posterior beliefs in illiquid states Ωi .
LEMMA 1 (Posterior beliefs in illiquid states). The initial value of the probability that
the firm is in state ig at the time of transition into the illiquid state is given by
π0 =

λl,ig (Z0 )
.
λl,ig (Z0 ) + λl,ib (Z0 )

(7)

Posterior beliefs π (t) evolve as follows:
dπt = $ (Z) (1 − πt ) πt dt − πdNtb + (1 − π) dNtg ,

(8)

where $ (Z) is defined as
$ (Z) =

X

λib ,z0 (Z) −

z 0 ∈Ωb

X

λig ,z0 (Z) ,

(9)

z 0 ∈Ωg

and where Ntj for j ∈ {g, b} is a counting process that switches from 0 to 1 when the
firm jumps into the set of revealing states Ωj for the first time. Let τZ (t) denote the
time period for which the firm has been illiquid while in aggregate state Z. The posterior
13

probability πt is given by

−1
P
− ∀Z τZ (t)·$(Z)) 1 − π0
(
π (t) = 1 + e
·
.
π0

(10)

Proof. The results follow from Bayes law.
If $ (Z) is constant across aggregate states Z, then the inference problem simplifies in
the sense that conditional on observing illiquidity (x < c), there is a one-to-one mapping
between the posterior probability π and the time since the last transition into the illiquid
state. Otherwise, the posterior probability also depends on the relative time spent in
aggregate states B vs. G. Further, if $ (Z) = 0, ∀Z, then passage time alone does not
alter beliefs πt .
The following proposition characterizes the equity value in illiquid states.
PROPOSITION 3 (Equity value in illiquid states). The firm’s equity value in illiquid
states is given by
Z

R

V (πt , Zt ) = max
Et
∗
{τ }

τ∗

t


ξ (Zτ )
(X (zτ ) − c) dτ = v R (πt , Zt )+ ,
ξ (Zt )

where the function v R (π, Z) solves a system of ODEs that is provided in Appendix B.4.
Equity holders optimally default in aggregate state Z when posterior beliefs π fall below
an endogenous cutoff value π R (Z) that is determined by the solution of the system.
Proof. See Appendix B.4.
Equity holders optimal default strategy can be summarized by the belief thresholds
π R (Z) for Z ∈ {G, B}. Equity holders keep the firm afloat as long as beliefs are above
these state-contingent thresholds. I use the superscript R to indicate that this equity
value will constitute a reservation value in section 3, where I discuss the extended model
that features an active investor.

2.3.3.

Initial Liquid States (Ωl )

Finally, we can characterize the equity values in initial liquid states (Ωl ).
PROPOSITION 4 (Equity value in initial liquid states). In the initial liquid states
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(z, Z) ∈ Ωl the firm’s equity value is given by
Z
V (zt , Zt ) = max
Et
∗
{τ }

t

τ∗


ξ (Zτ )
((X (zτ ) − c) dτ ) ,
ξ (Zt )

(11)

where the function V (z, Z) solves a system of equations that is provided in Appendix B.5.
Proof. See Appendix B.4.

2.4.

A Parameterized Illustration

In this section, I consider solutions to a parametrization of the model that aims to illustrate the effects of learning on equity risk premia when firms are close to default. Table
1 in the Appendix reports chosen parameter values common to all parameterizations in
this paper. I consider a parametrization that shows how in such an environment learning
can cause negative expected return premia for firms that are close to default, generating
striking dynamics in expected returns as the firm approaches the default boundaries.
Figure II plots equity values when the firm is in an illiquid state and the underlying
firm-state is hidden. Here, the two state variables determining equity values are beliefs
about the firm-specific state, π, and the observable aggregate state Z. In the left-hand
side panel, equity values are plotted over a wider region of beliefs. The right-hand side
panel of Figure II zooms in and provides a more detailed view of equity values close to the
default boundary. Whereas the equity value in the good aggregate state G is higher than
the one in the bad state B for higher values of π, the opposite is true in a region close
to default. Here the equity value in the bad aggregate state is higher, implying negative
co-movement of equity values with aggregate conditions at a business cycle frequency.
In the parametrization, earnings fundamentals are strongly positively correlated with
aggregate growth (see caption of Figure II): a solvent firm (ig ) is significantly more likely
to transition back into a state with higher earnings when the aggregate economy is in a
good state (G) than when it is in a bad state (B). Similarly, a truly insolvent firm (ib ) is
more likely to exhibit further deteriorating earnings when the aggregate economy is in a
downturn (B) than when it is in a boom (G). The chosen pro-cyclical parameterization
of earnings dynamics implies the intuitive notion that illiquid firms that show resilience
in downturns (B) by maintaining stable earnings see upward revisions in posterior beliefs
over time. In other words, passage time in the illiquid state in a downturn (B) increases
investors’ posterior beliefs about the hidden firm state and correspondingly lead to an
15
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FIGURE II
The graphs plot the equity value of the firm as a function of investors’ beliefs about the firm’s hidden state. The graph in the left-hand side panel plots the equity value over a range of beliefs
π ∈ [0, 0.4]. The right-hand side panel provides an enlarged picture of the equity value for beliefs π close to the default boundaries. Given the firm’s true
P state is ig (solvent), earnings revert
back up above the coupon rate with a total hazard rate ( Ωg λig ,z (Z)) of 0.25 and 0.40 in aggregate states B and G respectively. Given the firm’s true state
P is ib (insolvent), earnings deteriorate further and reveal insolvency with a total hazard rate ( Ωb λib ,z (Z)) of 0.65 and 0.25 in aggregate states B and G respectively. All other parameters are provided in Table 1 in Appendix A.

increase in equity values.9 In contrast, in booms, stable earnings are considered a bad
signal, since truly solvent firms are likely to show improvements in earnings performance
in the face of good overall economic conditions (G). Passage time in the illiquid state
in booms is thus seen as a sign of weakness and associated with decreasing beliefs and
declining equity values. In terms of the graphs in Figure II, in bad times (B), firms
that do not receive news about earnings changes drift upwards on their equity value
function. In contrast, in good times (G), the equity value drifts downwards absent news
and smoothly approaches a value of zero, where equity holders trigger default.

Expected returns and momentum. The negative comovement between aggregate
conditions and firm equity values in a region of beliefs πt close to the default boundaries
imply negative equity risk premia. Figure III illustrates expected equity returns as functions of beliefs π (left-hand side graphs) and passage time without events (right-hand
side graphs). Negative news about the firm leads to a downward revision in beliefs π and
a negative contemporaneous return (”recent loser”). Interestingly, since the firm is closer
to the default boundary after such a negative news shock, it also has lower expected
9

Statements about the evolution of beliefs as a function of passage time condition on the realization
of no jumps. Unconditionally, beliefs about the hidden firm state are naturally martingales.
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FIGURE III
The figure illustrates equity risk premia as a function of beliefs π (left-hand side) and passage time absent events such as changes in the earnings rate (right-hand side). In the graph
on the right-hand side, starting values for beliefs π are 0.5 and 0.15 in aggregate states
G and B respectively.
The graphs are based on the same parameterization as Figure II.

equity returns going forward.10 Conversely, good news that is associated with positive
price changes (”recent winners”), pushes the firm away from the default boundary and
implies higher expected equity returns going forward. A momentum strategy that goes
long recent winners and shorts recent losers may therefore generate a large spread in
expected returns. While the model reconciles these positive correlations between recent
price changes and expected returns for financially distressed firms, it predicts that the
phenomenon goes away the larger a firm’s distance is from default. This result is consistent with the empirical finding of Avramov, Chordia, Jostova, and Philipov (2007) that
both the long and the short portfolio of momentum strategies consist of stocks with high
default risk. According to the model, distressed firms are good candidates for portfolio
strategies that sort on past returns, since their past returns are strongly correlated with
changes in expected returns going forward.

The benefits of recessions. The illustration highlights effects that are related to
the notion that recessions have a ”cleansing effect” on the economy (Schumpeter, 1934).
When faced with the test of a downturn, truly insolvent firms are more likely to quickly
exhibit further deteriorating earnings, making it clear to equity holders that further equity
injections are not worthwhile and default is optimal. Empirically, this is consistent with
waves of defaults that typically occur in recessions and that motivated Schumpeter’s
10

More generally, one could extend the model to incorporate the arrival of new signals that lead to an
updating of beliefs independent of contemporaneous earnings changes.
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theory.11 Given that under current beliefs πt , the equity value is positive and equity
holders currently inject more funds, it is valuable to them if the firm, given it is in state
ib , will quickly show such adverse performance that they can easily conclude that default
is optimal – in other words, it is valuable if equity holders’ beliefs converge quickly toward
the truth in the future, especially conditional on the truth being bad. A fast expected
revelation of truly insolvent firms increases the equity value, as it limits expected future
losses equity holders will make by mistakenly injecting funds into truly insolvent firms.
Given the ”test of a downturn”, truly insolvent firms (ib ) are less likely to be able to
maintain stable earnings and pool with good firms (ig ), which improves the quality of
information equity holders use to make default decisions. Since the default option is a key
determinant of the equity value when the firm is close to default, learning can even induce
negative co-movement between distressed firms’ equity values and aggregate conditions
at a business-cycle frequency. In fact, everything else equal, an increased hazard rate of
adverse performance by insolvent firms in downturns, which increases the pro-cyclicality
of earnings fundamentals, decreases equity risk premia.
In section 3, I extend the presented baseline model to account for endogenous information acquisition by active investors. In this context, I will show that if learning about
insolvent firms based on earning performance is not fast in downturns, active investors
have a natural incentive to acquire information in these times and supplement exogenous
signals about firm solvency with endogenous signals.

2.5.

Empirical Implications

When relating the predictions of the model to the empirical literature it is important to note that empirical papers study expected returns of financially distressed stocks
at the portfolio level. Studies such as Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) sort the
cross-section of stocks based on default likelihood measures and then form portfolios
using quintile or decile breakpoints. The degree to which firms in these portfolios are
financially distressed varies therefore naturally over the business cycle. In particular,
the average firm in the quintile of most distressed stocks is generally more financially
distressed during a recession than during a boom. This is due to the empirical fact that
11

Despite the similarities, there are some important differences between the objects that Schumpeter
addressed and the ones that I am addressing in this paper. In this paper, I focus on equity values, whereas
Schumpeter was concerned with overall economic value of abandoning unworthy projects in downturns.
To the extent that insolvency is not just a result of excessive leverage but also a sign of a firm’s general
lack of economic viability, the described benefits of learning are however related to Schumpeter’s ideas.
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leverage tends to increase after a series of bad shocks, since firms do not instantaneously
adjust their capital structure. Given the model’s prediction that firms that are closer
to default have lower exposures to business-cycle frequency risks, this implies that the
quintile of most distressed stocks will have lower betas with respect to these risks in
downturns. Since market risk premia tend to be high in recessions, the model thus can
rationalize a negative correlation between market risk premia and portfolio betas. This
negative correlation however leads to the problem that unconditional CAPM regressions
yield positively biased betas and negatively biased alphas.12 Consistent with this prediction, O’Doherty (2012) finds empirically that the conditional betas of the quintile
of stocks that are most distressed are lower in downturns and are negatively correlated
with measures of the market risk premium. O’Doherty (2012) further estimates that
this negative correlation can account for roughly two thirds of the unconditional alpha of
financially distressed firms in US data. O’Doherty’s (2012) estimation approach which
follows Boguth, Carlson, Fisher, and Simutin (2011) does however use relatively high frequency data which is a necessary evil given the limited time period for which data that is
available. Yet according to the theory proposed in this paper, one would ideally explicitly
estimate time-varying low-frequency risk exposures. Estimating these low-frequency risk
exposures precisely would however require larger amounts of data.

3.

The Extended Model with Private Placements

In this section, I present an extended model featuring an active investor that can
produce information on the firm’s underlying hidden state. After analyzing this extended
model and illustrating the main findings, I provide further discussions of the robustness of
the model’s predictions with respect to alternative specifications of the active investor’s
technology and the Markov state dynamics (see subsection 3.4).

3.1.

The Active Investor

An active investor is endowed with an information production technology that allows
acquiring costly information on the firm’s true underlying state. When the firm is in an
illiquid state (z, Z) ∈ Ωi , the technology generate a perfectly precise signal of the hidden
firm state (z ∈ {ib , ig }) with a Poisson arrival rate a1−η
, where at denotes effort exerted
t
12

See, e.g., Grant (1977) and Jagannathan and Wang (1996).
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by the active investor and η ∈ (0, 1). The active investor incurs cost at rate at χ (with
χ > 0) for exerting effort at . Effort is not directly observable and not contractible.

Contracting. The analysis considers contracts between management and the active
investor that provide the active investor with new equity shares that yield an ownership
share ω at a purchase price κ̄. Management acts in the interest of existing shareholders.
Contracts are limited to one-time provisions of new equity at a price that dilutes existing
shareholders. Management does not renegotiate the contract in the future so that any
future equity injections by the active investor occur at the same terms as for all other
investors. In principle, the contract may be written at any point in time t̄ > 0. Yet there
is no reason to provide the active investor with an equity exposure before the firm enters
the illiquid states Ωi , since the active investor’s information technology is only useful in
states in which the underlying firm-state z is unknown.

The active investor’s equity exposure. The active investor faces limits to the
amount of capital it can allocate to the firm, implying an upper bound on the feasible equity share allocated to the active investor. The upper bound on ω may be due to
capital constraints or cost of un-diversification that limit the optimal amount of exposure for the active investor. Since this paper does not attempt to provide an explanation
for various economic forces that may limit the investor’s exposure, I consider the upper
bound on ω as exogenously given and focus on the asset pricing implications for a given
upper bound.

Information environment. Adjustments to the active investor’s position in the firm
are assumed to be publicly observable. The lack of noise in the system implies that
the active investor will not be able to extract rents from trading against less informed
investors, since market participants understand that the investor’s only motive for trade
is information. The paper thus focuses on active investors’ ability to make profits by
affecting firm policies rather than by trading against less informed parties. This view
is consistent with the general notion that active investors, after obtaining a stake in a
company, are actually involved in evaluating and shaping firm policies going forward.
There are several other reasons why I take this route.
First, in the case of private investments in public equity (”PIPEs”), which are a typical form of investments by active investors in distressed equity, management is directly
involved in the transaction and has the fiduciary duty to act in the interest of existing
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shareholders. In these transactions, management typically deliberately offers profits to
active investors by providing them with securities at discounted prices (see, e.g., Park
(2013)). This source of gains for active investors is exactly captured in my model.
Second, regulation in the United States requires that investors acquiring more than
5% of a firm’s equity with the intent to exert control have to file a 13d with the SEC
within 10 days. In addition, investors have to re-file these forms in case of material
changes to their positions (1%). These required regulatory filings ensure that information
about an active investor’s exposure becomes public at a high-enough frequency to help
inform other equity holders’ future financing and default decisions, which is the central
externality channel highlighted in this extended model.
Third, whereas adding noise to the system (for example by introducing noise traders
or liquidity shocks) would be an interesting extension in its own right, it would be somewhat distracting in the context of this paper which aims to address empirical facts on
existing shareholders’ buy-and-hold returns after private investments in public equity.
A buy-and-hold strategy does not correspond to random or selective buy-and-sell orders that are typical equilibrium outcomes of noisy rational expectations models. Low
buy-and-hold returns for existing shareholders cannot be explained by losses from trades
against informed counterparties. Further, adding noise to the system comes at the cost
of reducing analytical tractability and transparency.

Usage of excess cash. New funds provided by the active investor are invested in marketable securities until the funds are used to either make contractual coupon payments to
debt holders, or until management strategically liquidates the firm. In case of strategic
liquidation, management sells the marketable securities and pays out the proceeds as a
dividend to equity holders. Further, if the firm runs out of excess cash before its earnings
have recovered or a default has occurred, new equity may be raised to make coupon
payments (just as in the baseline model).13

Bargaining power. Management acting in the interest of existing equity holders naturally has the outside option not to issue shares to the active investor. The value of the
13

The assumption that excess cash can be paid out as a dividend at any time simplifies the analysis,
as it implies that excess cash is not a state variable that affects default decisions. This assumption is
however not essential for the highlighted qualitative results. If management could not pay out excess
cash, then equity holders would never choose to default while the firm still has a strictly positive excess
cash position. However, once the firm has used up its excess cash to make coupon payments, the same
optimal default strategy applies as in the setup discussed here.
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equity under this scenario constitutes the reservation value, V R , that implies a limit on
the price discount management is willing to offer the active investor for shares in the
firm. For simplicity, I consider the case where the active investor has all the bargaining
power when the contract is written, allowing it to obtain a purchase price that leaves old
shareholders just indifferent between the private placement of shares and the alternative
situation in which the active investor does not obtain a stake in the firm. All results
are qualitatively robust to cases in which the active investor cannot extract all the rents
it generates for equity holders by acquiring information. For the results on expected
return dynamics it is only essential that the active investor obtains a stake in the firm
that provides incentives to exert effort to acquire information on firm fundamentals. The
distribution of bargaining power only alters the degree of initial dilution of existing shareholders. Empirically documented dilution of existing shareholders via private placements
of public equity suggests that active investors are in fact able to extract part of the rents
they generate (see, e.g., Park (2013)).

3.2.
3.2.1.

Analysis
Illiquid States (Ωi )

The active investor’s information production technology can generate rents for equity
holders when the firm is in illiquid states and there is uncertainty about the firm’s
solvency. Providing the active investor with an equity stake thus optimally occurs as
soon as the firm enters an illiquid state and generates earnings at rate x < c. Note that
there is no uncertainty about the firm’s state until it transitions into the illiquid state,
implying that there is no room for learning or information production in the initial liquid
states Ωl . As discussed in Lemma 1, investors’ conditional beliefs at that time when the
firm transitions into an illiquid state are given by π0 (Z), implying that the reservation
value is given by V R (π0 (Zt ) , Zt ).
Let V (π, Z, κ̄) denote the total equity value at the time when the active investor
acquires a stake in the firm at price κ̄. The issuance of new equity to the active investor
implies a cash infusion, generating an initial excess cash position of κ̄ for the firm. While
in the illiquid state, the firm’s excess cash balance evolves according to
dκ = (x − c) dt,
as long as the firm still has cash κt > 0 and is not liquidated. The following proposition
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characterizes the solution to the active investor’s dynamic decision problem conditional
on holding an ω-share of the equity in the firm.
PROPOSITION 5 (Value of the active investor in illiquid states). In the illiquid state,
the active investor’s value is given by
Z

τ∗


ξ (Zτ )
ξ (Zτ ∗ )
V (πt , Zt , κt ) = max
Et
(ω (X(zτ ) − c) − at χ) dτ +
ωκτ ∗
{τ ∗ ,a}
ξ (Zt )
ξ (Zt )
t
= v A (πt , Zt )+ + ωκt .
(12)
A

The function v A (π, Z) solves a system of ODEs that is provided in Appendix B.6. The
active investor optimally proposes default whenever she obtains a bad signal, or when in
aggregate state Z posterior beliefs π fall below an endogenous cutoff value π A (Z) that
is determined by the solution of the system. The active investor’s optimal information
acquisition effort is given by

a (π, Z) =


η (1 − υ)
πωV (ig , Z) − v A (π, Z))
χ

 υ1

, for π > π A (Z).

(13)

Proof. See Appendix B.6.
The active investor optimally proposes the payout of cash (if κt > 0) or simply
abandons the firm (if κt = 0) when the discounted present value of its opportunity
cost of information production and net-dividends falls below zero. This solution again
corresponds to a cutoff strategy in the posterior belief π that depends on the aggregate
state Z. Specifically, if the conditional probability that the firm is solvent, πt , drops
below a threshold π A (Zt ), the active investor proposes liquidation or abandons the firm.
For πt > π A (Zt ), it is incentive compatible for the active investor to hold on to the
equity share ω and to utilize the information production technology to the extent that it
maximizes the active investor’s value.
Proposition 5 characterizes the active investor’s optimal behavior conditional on a
given ω−share in the firm. The optimal share ω is given by the maximum feasible
ω ∈ [0, 1] subject to the active investor’s capital constraint. Absent capital constraints
or other forces that limit the active investor’s exposure to the firm (such as cost of undiversification), the active investor optimally obtains a 100% stake in the firm such that
it fully internalizes equity holders’ benefits from employing its information production
technology. With a 100% stake the active investor maximizes total rents to equity holders
and equalizes equity holders’ marginal gains from improved information quality with
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marginal information production cost.
If the active investor obtains a bad signal s = ib , she will propose a dividend payment if the firm currently has excess cash (κt > 0) and refuse further equity injections.
Attempting to sell the equity stake will yield a price of zero, since other investors can
infer that the active investor must have received a negative signal if current beliefs πt are
above the threshold π A (Zt ). Since a signal s = ib implies that the firm is insolvent, other
equity holders will support the active investor’s proposal to pay a dividend and will also
abandon the firm thereafter. Through this channel, equity holders may effectively free
ride on the active investor’s information production once the active investor is exposed
to the firm’s equity. The following proposition characterizes the value of the equity in
the presence of this externality.
PROPOSITION 6 (Equity value in illiquid states with active investor). The firm’s
equity value in illiquid states is given by
Z

τ∗

ξ (Zτ )
ξ (Zτ ∗ )
((X
(z
)
−
c)
dτ
)
+
κτ ∗
V (πt , Zt , κt ) = max
E
t
τ
{τ ∗ }
ξ (Zt )
ξ (Zt )
t
= v (πt , Zt )+ + κt .


(14)

The function v (π, Z) solves a system of ODEs that is provided in Appendix B.7. Equity
holders optimally agree to default or liquidate the firm when the active investor proposes
to do so. Equity holders further choose to default when in aggregate state Z posterior
beliefs π fall below the endogenous cutoff value π A (Z) from the active investor’s problem.
Proof. See Appendix B.7.
Proposition 6 shows that existing shareholders abandon the firm at the same threshold
as the active investor, that is at π A (Z). The intuition for this result is as follows. The
active investor’s value is naturally bounded from below by the value of its equity position
under a passive strategy, that is V A (π, Z) ≥ ωV R (π, Z). This is the case since the
active investor could always choose to set its effort to zero (at = 0) and simply hold
the equity stake. Since V A and V R are both increasing functions of the probability
that the firm is in the solvent state, π (t), the active investor’s optimal abandonment
cutoff π A (Z) is always weakly lower than the optimal reservation value cutoff, that is,
π A (Z) ≤ π R (Z). Further, as soon as the active investor abandons the firm, other
equity holders may no longer free-ride on the active investor’s information production,
implying that their value is simply captured by (1 − ω) V R . The equity value absent
active investor involvement, V R , has to be equal to be zero at π (t) = π A (Z) since the
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active investor value V A (π, Z) is zero, and V A ≥ ωV R . On the other hand, for beliefs
above the abandonment threshold, π (t) > π A (Z), passive shareholders’ equity value
must be positive since the active investor’s value is positive and passive equity holders
benefit from free-riding on the fund’s information production, that is, they share the
same benefits but do not incur information production cost.14

Excess Cash κ. Proposition 6 shows that the equity value is additively separable in
the excess cash position κt and the equity value corresponding to core assets v (πt , Zt )+ .
The value function simplifies in this way since excess cash may be paid out at any point in
time and investments in marketable securities have a zero NPV. Thus, the abandonment
decision is independent of the current level of excess cash κ.
If the active investor has all the bargaining power, existing shareholders obtain exactly
their reservation value V R as a result of the equity issuance to the active investor, that
is, the purchase price κ̄ is set such that existing shareholders’ stake is worth V R after the
equity issuance. For an ω-share in the firm’s post-issuance equity the active investor’s
purchase price is thus given by

κ̄ =

V R (π, Z)
− v (π, Z)+ .
(1 − ω)

(15)

Existing shareholders’ ability to free ride on the information produced by the active
investor in the illiquid states therefore does not increase shareholder value in the liquid
state given that the active investor has all the bargaining power when it purchases the
equity stake.

The value of information in financial distress. Information production by the
active investor would not be an equilibrium feature if the firm had no debt, since information would not alter decisions and therefore generate no value.15 The proximity to
default makes information valuable to equity holders, and is therefore an integral part
14

As described in the setup, management commits not to renegotiate once the initial contract is
written. If renegotiation is allowed, changes to the debt contract could be considered as well, which is
outside of the scope of this paper (see, e.g., Garlappi, Shu, and Yan (2008) for analysis of the effects of
renegotiation upon default).
15
In the setup the firm’s assets always generate positive dividends, implying that the firm should
never be shut down – the abandonment option problem would be trivial. Yet if c is interpreted as a
maintenance flow cost required to preserve the assets (instead of a coupon payment) even an all-equity
firm benefits from information production. In other words, operating leverage would be an alternative
interpretation for the setup.
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of the proposed mechanism that jointly drives active investor activity, diluted equity issuances, and dynamics in expected returns. If the active investor were to learn about the
firm state, but there was no state of the world in which default was optimal, the decision
value of information would be zero and the information production technology would not
be used. This is true despite the fact that the setup features stochastic differential utility:
there are no gains to acquiring information on the firm-specific state based on an earlyresolution-of-uncertainty motive, since this information does not alter the representative
household’s information set with regards to aggregate consumption dynamics.
When a firm is in distress, the value of the abandonment option embedded in the
equity stake naturally constitutes a particularly large fraction of the total equity value.
The option value in turn depends critically on the quality information available to agents
that exercise the option. The more precise the information the better are exercising
decisions, and the more valuable is the option to the agent. The quality of information
is therefore an important determinant of the equity value close to the default boundary.
Further, as will be illustrated in the next section, variation in the quality of information
therefore also critically affects the co-movement of the firm’s equity value with aggregate
conditions.

Alternative governance channels. Alternative channels through which active investors may affect firm value include proxy fights, shareholder proposals to replace management, and the alike. Whereas these alternative types of investor activism could be
beneficial whenever the firm faces operating decisions, they do not necessarily relate to
firms in financial distress: even in the case of an all-equity firm investor activism of this
type could affect the firm’s decisions and thereby alter exposures to aggregate risk – in
other words, proximity to default would not be an essential ingredient. Yet this paper
aims to provide a coherent explanation for the fact that the puzzling empirical regularities
addressed are all concentrated among firms with high default risk.

3.3.

A Parameterized Illustration

In this section, I discuss a parametrization that illustrates how endogenous information acquisition by an active investor affects equity risk premia of financially distressed
firms. Throughout, I will focus the discussion on the part of the equity value that corresponds to the firm’s core assets. The effect of the excess cash position κ on the firm’s
equity risk premium depends on the types of securities the firm invests in, a choice which
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is not uniquely pinned down by the model. Investment in any fairly priced security in
the economy would be consistent with shareholder value maximization. To determine
the overall risk premium on equity, one simply has to take the value-weighted average of
the risk premium on the firm’s core assets and the one on its marketable securities.
In the parametrization used for figures II and III, learning from past earnings was
strong enough in the bad aggregate state B, relative to the good aggregate state G to
induce negative equity risk premia close to default. Relative to this parametrization, the
following example, illustrated in Figure IV, only changes the values of two transition rates
(see caption of Figure IV for details). These different transition rates imply that solvent
firms are now much more likely to leave the illiquid state in booms (G), generating larger
benefits from learning in these times than in state B. Given learning is now strongly procyclical, it does little to counteract the underlying pro-cylicality of earnings dynamics and
cannot reverse the standard result that equity risk premia increase as the firm approaches
the default boundary.
However, the example reveals that a private placement of a 20% public equity stake
to an active investor can significantly reduce equity holders’ expected returns. Figure IV
plots the firm’s equity risk premium with and without active investor participation in
state G (left-hand side) and state B (right-hand side) as a function of beliefs. Further,
the figure plots the expected returns on the active investor’s position, which includes the
active investor’s information acquisition cost. The graphs reveal that the participation of
an active investor greatly reduces equity risk premia of other equity holders and extends
the range of beliefs for which equity holders are willing to keep the firm afloat. Due to
the presence of the active investor and its information acquisition, equity holders’ option
value is increased. The active investor has a higher exposure to aggregate risk than other
shareholders, since it endogenously incurs higher information acquisition cost in the bad
aggregate state Z = B. This implies higher expected returns for the active investor’s
strategy than for other equity holders.
The example illustrates the stark difference in the dynamics of risk premia with and
without the participation of an active investor. This result is directly supported by the
empirical finding by Park (2013) that low returns for distressed firms are concentrated
among those firms that issue public equity in private placements. The theoretical results
of the model in fact also predict that the degree of dilution of existing shareholders is
determined by the effectiveness of the active investor and therefore should be negatively
related to expected returns going forward.

27

Risk Premia in State Z=G
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FIGURE IV
The figure plots risk premia for passive equity investors with and without participation of an
active investor (”with AI”, ”w/o AI”) and for the active investor (”AI’s position”) in aggregate states G (left-hand side panel) and B (right-hand side panel).
Given the firm’s true
state is ig , earnings revert back up above the coupon rate with a hazard rate of 0.25 and
1.20 in aggregate states B and G respectively. Given the firm’s true state is ib , earnings deteriorate further and reveal insolvency with a total hazard rate of 0.60 and 0.25 in aggregate
states B and G respectively. All other parameters are provided in Table 1 in Appendix A.

3.4.

Robustness

Endogenous vs. exogenous information. The active investor’s participation can
also reduce equity risk exposures if the active investor cannot adjust its effort at over the
business cycle. Specifically, the effect of the active investor’s participation is still present
if the investor is endowed with a constant hazard rate of obtaining a signal on the hidden
firm state. I consider endogenous effort to highlight that the active investor would in
fact have incentives to acquire information in a way that reduces expected equity returns
going forward. Further, it appears reasonable that active investors can at least to some
degree choose the extent to which they focus on distressed companies over the business
cycle, implying endogenous variation in effort targeted at evaluating distressed firms.

Alternative Markov state dynamics & precautionary information acquisition.
As already discussed in section 2.2, it is not essential that uncertainty about the underlying firm state arises only in illiquid states. The Markov chain setup could be extended
to capture the notion that investors already face uncertainty about the firm’s true state
before the firm lacks sufficient funds to make its debt payments. In this case, it would
be useful to involve the active investor as soon as this uncertainty arises, even if equity
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holders do not face an immediate default decision at that point in time.16 This is the
case, since it is less costly for the active investor to spread out information acquisition
effort over time – in other words, there would be precautionary information acquisition.
In addition, precautionary information acquisition would naturally intensify the closer
the firm gets to an illiquid state in which the information is actually used to make a
well-informed default decision.

4.

Conclusion

This paper provides a tractable dynamic asset pricing model to analyze the effects
of learning and active investors’ information production on expected return dynamics of
financially distressed firms. The model reveals that learning can rationalize low and even
negative expected equity returns for illiquid firms, and that issuances of privately placed
public equity to active investors may constitute an important factor influencing expected
returns on passive equity holders’ positions. Further, the model can explain the empirical
finding by Avramov, Chordia, Jostova, and Philipov (2007) that momentum profits are
restricted to high credit risk firms and are nonexistent for firms of high credit quality. The
analysis suggests that information acquisition by specialized intermediaries may generate
substantial externalities on other shareholders and may be related to intriguing empirical
facts related to distressed firms’ expected returns.

16

As long as the firm generates positive dividends it is always optimal not to default, independent of
the underlying hidden firm state.
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A.

Tables

Table 1
The table lists common parameter values underlying the illustrations in Figures II, III, and IV.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Parameter Descriptions

Notation

Transition rates between aggregate states
Aggregate consumption growth
Coefficient of relative risk aversion
Rate of time preference
Elasticity of intertemporal substitution
Curvature of active investor’s hazard rate function
Active investor’s information cost parameter
Active investor’s equity share
Earnings rate in the illiquid states
Mean equity value17 after jumping from (ig , Z) to Ωg

λ(Z)
θ(Z)
γ(Z)
β
ψ
η
χ
ω
x
E[V |Z]

Values
Z=B Z=G
0.40 0.15
0.00 0.04
100
6
0.01
3.00
0.50
0.22
0.20
0.05
16.07 20.96

Table 2
The table lists equilibrium values corresponding to the illustrations in Figures II, III,
and IV. The term ”levered consumption claim” refers to a levered version of aggregate consumption as considered in Abel (1999), using a leverage parameter of 3.5.

Variable Descriptions
1. Risk-free rate
2. Risk premium of consumption claim
3. Risk premium of levered consumption claim
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Notation
rf (Z)
rpC (Z)
rpL (Z)

Values
Z=B Z=G
0.010 0.016
0.013 0.010
0.067 0.042

B.

Proofs

B.1.

Proof of Proposition 1

In equilibrium, the representative household consumes the aggregate consumption
flow Ct . The value function is given by
∞

Z
J (Ct , Zt ) = Et


f (Cτ , Jτ ) dτ .

(16)

t

The Hamilton-Jacoby-Bellman (HJB) equation in state Z (for all Z ∈ Ω) is therefore
0 = f (Y, J (Y, Z)) + JY (Y, Z) Y θ (Z) +

X

λZZ 0 (J (Y, Z 0 ) − J (Y, Z)) .

(17)

Z 0 6=Z

Conjecture the solution for J takes the standard form
J (C, Z) = F (Z)

C α(Z)
.
α (Z)

(18)

Substituting this conjecture into the HJB equation yields the following system of nonlinear equations for F (Z), for all Z:

0=



X
ρ(Z)
βα (Z) 
− α(Z)
− 1 + α (Z) θ (Z) F (Z) +
λ (Z) (F (Z 0 ) − F (Z)) .
F (Z)
ρ (Z)
Z 0 6=Z

(19)
Household maximization implies that a state-pricing process ξt may be written as follows:
Z
ξt ≡ exp

t


fJ (Cτ , Jτ ) dτ fC (Ct , Jt ) .

(20)

0
α(Z )

Using the value function J (Ct , Zt ) = F (Zt )

α(Zt )−1

ξt = Ct

βF (Zt )

ρ(Z )
t

1− α(Zt )

(
Rt

e

0

Ct t
α(Zt )

we obtain

ρ(Zt )
−
β(α(Zt )−ρ(Zt ))
βα(Z )
F (Zτ ) α(Zt ) − ρ(Z t)
ρ(Zt )
t
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!

)

dτ

.

(21)

dξ

Applying Itô’s lemma to obtain rf (Z) = −
rf (Z) =

and

Et dtt
ξt−

yields

ρ
βα (Zt ) β (α (Zt ) − ρ (Zt ))
−
F (Z)− α − (α (Zt ) − 1) θ (Z)
ρ (Zt )
ρ (Zt )
!
ρ(Zt )

1− α(Z
X
t)
F (Z 0 )
−
λZZ 0
−1 .
F (Z)
Z 0 6=Z

X

dξt
0
= −rf (Zt− ) dt +
(eφ(Zt− ,Z ) − 1) dNt (Zt− , Z 0 ) − λZt− Z 0 dt ,
ξt−
Z 0 6=Z

(22)
(23)

(24)

t−

where Nt (Z, Z 0 ) is a counting process that keeps track of the number of Markov chain
jumps from state Z to state Z 0 , and φ (Z, Z 0 ) is defined as follows:




ρ (Z)
F (Z 0 )
φ (Z, Z ) ≡ 1 −
log
.
α (Z)
F (Z)
0

B.2.

(25)

Proof of Proposition 2

In the states (z, Z) ∈ Ωg , the firm’s equity value is given by
Z
V (zt , Zt ) = max
Et
∗
{τ }

τ∗

t


ξ (Zτ )
(X (zτ ) − c) dτ = v (zt , Zt )+ ,
ξ (Zt )

(26)

The corresponding HJB equation implies that the function v (z, Z) solves the following
system of equations for all (z, Z) ∈ Ωg :
X

0 = X (z) − c − rf (Z) v (z, Z) +



+
λzz0 (Z) v (z 0 , Z) − v (z, Z)

(z 0 ,Z)∈Ωg \(z,Z)

+

X




0
+
λ (Z) eφ(Z,Z ) v (z, Z 0 ) − v (z, Z) .

(27)

Z 0 6=Z

B.3.

Equity Value in Solvent and Illiquid States (ig , Z)

The firm’s equity value in states (ig , Z) is given by
Z
V (ig , Zt ) = max
Et
∗
τ

t

τ∗


ξ (Zτ )
(X (zτ ) − c) dτ .
ξ (Zt )
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(28)

The corresponding HJB equation implies that the function V (ig , Z) solves the following
system of equations for all Z:
0 = x − c − rf (Z) V (ig , Z) +

X

λig ,z0 (Z) (V (z 0 , Z) − V (ig , Z))

(z 0 ,Z)∈Ωg

+

X

0

λ (Z) eφ(Z,Z ) (V (ig , Z 0 ) − V (ig , Z)) .

(29)

Z 0 6=Z

B.4.

Proof of Proposition 3

Absent active investor involvement, the firm’s equity value in the illiquid state is given
by
Z

R

V (πt , Zt ) = max
Et
∗
{τ }

t

τ∗


ξ (Zτ )
(X (zτ ) − c) dτ = v R (πt , Zt )+ .
ξ (Zt )

The corresponding HJB equation yields the following set of ODEs that the function
function v R (π, Z) solves for Z ∈ {G, B}:
0 = x − c − rf (Z) v R (π, Z) + vπR (π, Z)$ (Z) (1 − π) π
X
+
πλig ,z0 (Z) (V (z 0 , Z) − v R (π, Z))
(z 0 ,Z)∈Ωg

−

X

(1 − π) λib ,z0 (Z) v R (π, Z)

(z 0 ,Z)∈Ωb

+

X


0
λ (Z) eφ(Z,Z ) v R (π, Z 0 ) 1{π≥πR (Z 0 )} − v R (π, Z) .

(30)

Z 0 6=Z

In states Z for which $ (Z) < 0, the following conditions are satisfied at π R (Z): 0 =
vπR (π R (Z) , Z), 0 = v R (π R (Z) , Z). If $ (Z) > 0, π R (Z) is set such that v R (π R (Z) , Z) =
0 and limπ↑1 v R (π, Z) = V (ig , Z). If $ (Z) = 0, then the ODE for state Z simplifies to
a nonlinear equation.

Boundary Conditions. If $ (Z) < 0 in state Z, then v R (πt , Z) satisfies the smooth
pasting and value matching conditions,

0 = $ (Z) · 1 − π R∗ (Z) · π R∗ (Z) · vπR (π R∗ (Z) , Z),

(31)

0 = v R (π R∗ (Z) , Z).

(32)
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If $ (Z) > 0, then π R∗ (Z) has to be chosen such that v R (π R∗ (Z) , Z) = 0 and v R (1, Z)
matches V (ig , Z). If $ (Z) = 0, then the ODE for state Z simplifies to a nonlinear

equation. To verify these boundary conditions, let V̄ R πt , Zt , τ R denote the equity
value given beliefs πt , aggregate state Zt , and given that the agent follows a strategy
of abandoning the firm at time t + τ R if no jump to any other state occurs in the time
between t and t + τ R . The first-order necessary condition for τ R yields
∂ V̄ R πt , Zt , τ R
∂τ R


= 0.
τ R =τ R∗

A change in variables yields alternatively
!

∂ Ṽ R πt , Zt , π R dπ R τ R , πt , Zt
·
∂π R
dτ R

= 0,
τ R =τ R∗


where I define the function π R τ R , πt , Zt as follows:
π

R

R

τ , πt , Zt



−1

R ·$(Z )
1 − πt
−τZ
(
t )
t
,
= 1+e
·
πt
R

> 0. Thus, for πt ∈ (0, 1) the first-order
implying that for all πt ∈ (0, 1) we have dπ
dτ R
necessary condition may also be written as
∂ Ṽ R πt , Zt , π R
∂π R


= 0,
π R =π R∗ (Zt )

where I define

π R∗ (Zt ) ≡ π R τ R∗ , πt , Zt .
Notice that for $ (Z) > 0, any τ R ≥ 0 will correspond to π R ≥ πt , since waiting time
τ R increases the conditional probability πt . Let V R (πt , Zt ) denote the value function
from the optimal solution of the equity holders’ problem. Given the assumption that the
equity value is strictly positive at πt , i.e. V R (πt , Zt ) > 0, we obtain


V R π R τ R , πt , Zt , Zt ≥ V R (πt , Zt ) > 0, for all τ R ≥ 0,

R (π,Z )
t
≥ 0 for all π ∈ [πt , 1], since π R τ R , πt , Zt ≥ πt for all τ R ≥ 0.
given that ∂V ∂π
∂V R (π,Zt )
≥ 0 follows from the assumption that V (ig , Zt ) > V (ib , Zt ) = 0. Thus, given
∂π
that V R (πt , Zt ) > 0 and $ (Z) > 0, the equity value after any positive waiting time is
34

also positive, and thus it is optimal not to abandon the firm as long as it stays in the
current state, that is, it is optimal to set τ R∗ = ∞. Since

lim π R τ R , πt , Zt = 1,

τ R →∞

the ODE simplifies in the limit τ R → ∞ to the non-linear equation that the function
V (ig , Zt ) solves, implying that
lim V R (πt , Zt ) = V (ig , Zt ) .

π→1

R

On the other hand, for $ (Z) < 0, it follows that dπ
< 0, implying that waiting time
dτ R
corresponds to lower conditional probabilities πt . By assumption, at π = 0 the equity
value is zero (V (ib , Z) = 0), and the firm is abandoned. Further, by assumption, we have
V R (1, Z) = V (ig , Z) > 0. It is optimal to abandon at π R∗ where π R∗ satisfies

V R π R∗ , Z = 0,
and where the smooth pasting condition
∂V R (π, Zt )
∂π

= 0,
πt =π R∗

is satisfied. If smooth pasting was not satisfied then there could be an optimal cutoff π Rˆ

where the resulting value function V Rˆ satisfies V Rˆ π Rˆ , Z = 0 and
∂V Rˆ (π, Zt )
∂π

> 0.
πt =π Rˆ

Yet, then heuristically, at πt = π Rˆ , the agent benefits from waiting another instant ∆t
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and abandoning the firm afterwards, since the expected income flow is positive:
(x − c +

X

π(t) · λig ,z0 (Z) · V (z 0 , Z)) · ∆t

z 0 ∈Ωg

X

+

(1 − π(t)) · λib ,z0 (Z) · V (z 0 , Z) · ∆t

z 0 ∈Ωb

X

+

+

λ (Z) · (1 − κ (Z, Z 0 )) · v R (πt , Z 0 ) · ∆t

Z 0 6=Z

= −VπRˆ (πt , Z)

dπt
· ∆t
dt

> 0.

(33)

This contradicts that π Rˆ is an optimal cutoff. Since
optimization and since ∂V
Rˆ
it follows that ∂V ∂π(π,Zt )

R (π,Z )
t

∂π

∂V Rˆ (π,Zt )
∂π

πt =π Rˆ

> 0 violates

is weakly positive over the whole domain π ∈ [0, 1],
= 0 must hold at the optimal cutoff π R∗ (Z), given

πt =π R∗ (Z)

that $ (Z) < 0.

B.5.

Proof of Proposition 4

In the initial liquid states (z, Z) ∈ Ωl the firm’s equity value is given by
Z
V (zt , Zt ) = max
Et
∗
{τ }

t

τ∗


ξ (Zτ )
((X (zτ ) − c) dτ ) ,
ξ (Zt )

(34)

The corresponding HJB equation implies that the function V (z, Z) solves the following
system of equations for all (z, Z) ∈ Ωl :
 X
0 = X (z) − c − rf (Z) V (z, Z) + V R (π0 (Z) , Z) − V (z, Z)
λzz0 (Z)
(z 0 ,Z)∈Ωi

X

+

λzz0 (Z) (V (z 0 , Z) − V (z, Z))

(z 0 ,Z)∈Ωl \(z,Z)

+

X

0

λ (Z) eφ(Z,Z ) (V (z, Z 0 ) − V (z, Z)) .

Z 0 6=Z
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(35)

B.6.

Proof of Proposition 5

In the illiquid state, the active investor’s value from its exposure to the firm is given
by
Z

τ∗


ξ (Zτ )
ξ (Zτ ∗ )
V (πt , Zt , κt ) = max
Et
(ω (X(zτ ) − c) − at χ) dτ +
ωκτ ∗
{τ ∗ ,a}
ξ (Zt )
ξ (Zt )
t
= v A (πt , Zt )+ + ωκt .
(36)
A

The corresponding HJB equation yields the following set of ODEs that the function
v A (π, Z) solves for Z ∈ {G, B}:
0 = ω(x − c) − a (π, Z) χ − rf (Z) v A (π, Z) + vπA (π, Z)$ (Z) (1 − π) π
X
X
+
πλig ,z0 (Z) (ωV (z 0 , Z) − v A (π, Z)) −
(1 − π) λib ,z0 (Z) v A (π, Z)
(z 0 ,Z)∈Ωg

(z 0 ,Z)∈Ωb

+a (π, Z)1−η
X

0
+
λ (Z) eφ(Z,Z ) v A (π, Z 0 ) 1{π>πA (Z 0 )} − v A (π, Z) ,

πωV (ig , Z) − v A (π, Z))

(37)

Z 0 6=Z

The first order necessary condition for at yields

a (π, Z) =


1−η
πωV (ig , Z) − v A (π, Z))
χ

 η1

, for π > π A (Z).

(38)

In states Z for which $ (Z) < 0, the following conditions are satisfied at π A (Z): 0 =
vπA (π A (Z) , Zt ), 0 = v A (π A (Z) , Zt ). If $ (Z) > 0 for all Z ∈ {G, B}, then π A (Z) is set
such that v A (π A (Z) , Z) = 0 and limπ↑1 v A (π, Z) = ωV (ig , Z). If $ (Z) = 0, then the
ODE simplifies to a nonlinear equation.

Boundary Conditions. As in proposition 3, smooth pasting and value matching applies in aggregate states Z for which $ (Z) < 0,

0 = $ (Z) 1 − π A∗ (Z) · π A∗ (Z) · vπA (π A∗ (Z) , Zt ),

(39)

0 = v A (π A∗ (Z) , Zt ).

(40)

If $ (Z) > 0, then π A∗ (Z) has to be chosen such that v A (π A∗ (Z) , Z) = 0 and v A (1, Z)
matches ωV (ig , Z). If $ (Z) = 0, then the ODE simplifies to a nonlinear equation.
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B.7.

Proof of Proposition 6

The firm’s equity value in the illiquid state is given by
Z

τ∗

ξ (Zτ )
ξ (Zτ ∗ )
V (πt , Zt , κt ) = max
Et
((X (zτ ) − c) dτ ) +
κτ ∗
∗
τ
ξ (Zt )
ξ (Zt )
t
= v (πt , Zt )+ + κt .


(41)

The corresponding HJB equation yields the following set of ODEs that the function
v (π, Z) solves for Z ∈ {G, B}:
0 = x − c − rf (Z) v (π, Z) + vπ (π, Z)$ (Z) (1 − π) π
X
+
πλig ,z0 (Z) (V (z 0 , Z) − v (π, Z))
(z 0 ,Z)∈Ωg

−

X

(1 − π) λib ,z0 (Z) v (π, Z)

(z 0 ,Z)∈Ωb

+a (π, Z)1−η (πV (ig , Z) − v (π, Z)))
X

0
λ (Z) eφ(Z,Z ) v (π, Z 0 ) 1{π≥π∗ (Z 0 )} − v (π, Z) ,
+

(42)

Z 0 6=Z

where a is the optimal solution to the active investor’s problem and where π ∗ (Z) =
π A (Z). In states Z for which $ (Z) < 0, we have the condition limπ↓π∗ (Z) v(π, Z) = 0.
If $ (Z) > 0, then limπ↑1 v (π, Z) = V (ig , Z). If $ (Z) = 0, then the ODE simplifies to
a nonlinear equation.
Equity holders take the active investor’s optimal decisions (at and π A (Z)) as given.
The active investor optimally reveals information as soon as she obtains information.
Information revelation through the active investor is thus independent of the underlying
firm state (ig vs. ib ) and thus does not alter the evolution of beliefs absent signals (that
is, $ (Z) is identical to the case without active investor).

Boundary Conditions (Case 1 $ (Z) < 0): For states Z with $ (Z) < 0, the
function v (π, Z) matches a value of zero at π = π A∗ , that is v(π A∗ , Z) = 0 (smooth
pasting holds as well ∂v(π,Z)
|π=πA∗ = 0. At π = π A∗ , the active investor abandons the
∂π
firm, implying that the equity holders are left with the reservation value V R (π, Z). Since
the active investor’s value is naturally bounded from below by the value of its equity
position under a passive strategy (at = 0), optimization implies the relation V A (π, Z) ≥
A (π,Z)
R (π,Z)
ωV R (π, Z). Since ∂V ∂π
≥ 0 and ∂V ∂π
≥ 0, it is also the case that the active
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investor’s optimal abandonment cutoff π A∗ (Z) is weakly lower than the equity holders’
optimal reservation value cutoff, that is, π A∗ (Z) ≤ π R∗ (Z). The equity value absent
active investor involvement, V R , has to be equal to be zero at π (t) = π A∗ (Z) since the
active investor value V A (π, Z) is zero, and ωV R (π, Z) ≤ V A (π, Z). For π (t) > π A∗ (Z),
it be that V (πt , Zt ) > 0, since V A (π, Z) > 0 and passive equity holders obtain the same
benefits as the active investor from holding the equity (up to the scaling factor ω), but
do not bear the flow cost of information acquisition going forward. The smooth pasting
condition
lim Vπ (π, Zt ) = lim Vπ (π, Zt ) = 0,
πt ↓π A∗ (Z)

πt ↑π A∗ (Z)

applies at πt = π A∗ (Z). If it were the case that Vπ (π, Zt ) |πt =πA∗ (Z) > 0, and v (πt , Z) = 0,
then equity holders would benefit from waiting for another instant since active investor
abandonment implies at = 0, implying equity holders would obtain the positive flow
(x − c +

X

π(t)λig ,z0 (Z) (V (z 0 , Z))) · ∆t

z 0 ∈Ωg

+

X

(1 − π(t)) λib ,z0 (Z) (V (z 0 , Z)) · ∆t

z 0 ∈Ωb

+

X



+
λ (Z) (1 − κ (Z, Z 0 )) v (πt , Z 0 ) · ∆t.

Z 0 6=Z

= −vπ (π A∗ (Z) , Z)

dπt
· ∆t
dt

> 0.

(43)

Yet this would imply that π = π A∗ (Z) is not an optimal cutoff. π A∗ (Z) is thus

not an optimal abandonment cutoff for equity holders unless V π A∗ (Z) , Z = 0, and
Vπ (π, Zt ) |πt =πA∗ (Z) > 0.
Boundary Conditions (Case 2 $ (Z) > 0): For $ (Z) > 0, then v (1, Z) matches
the value V (ig , Z). If $ (Z) = 0, then the ODE simplifies to a nonlinear equation. The
value function for state Z, denoted by v (π, Z), generally jumps discontinuously from
zero to a positive value at π = π A∗ (Z). By definition, the value of the active investor’s

position at π = π A∗ (Z) zero, that is, V A π A∗ (Z) , Z = 0. If the active investor has
not abandoned the firm yet, it must be that the equity value is strictly positive, that is,

V π A∗ (Z) , Z > 0, since equity holders obtain the same benefits as the active investor
from holding the equity (up to the scaling factor ω), but do not bear the flow cost of


information acquisition going forward. Thus, ωV π A∗ (Z) , Z > V A π A∗ (Z) , Z = 0.
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